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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 10, 1995, sixteen-year-old Keith Brennan and eighteen-year-
old Joshua Nelson used a baseball bat and a box cutter knife to kill eighteen-
year-old Tommy Owens.' Owens remained conscious during the attack and
pleaded for his life, but neither Brennan, nor Nelson showed any mercy
toward him. Law enforcement officers apprehended Brennan and Nelson a
short time after the murder. The jury found Keith Brennan guilty as
1. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S365 (July 8, 1999).
2. Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1999).
3. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365.
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charged for the murder of Owens and recommended the death penalty.4 The
trial judge followed the jury's recommendation and sentenced Brennan to
death.*5 However, on July 8, 1999, the Supreme Court of Florida vacated
Brennan's death sentence and reduced his sentence to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole.6 The court held that executing Keith
Brennan would be cruel or unusual punishment under article I, section 17 of
the Florida Constitution because Brennan was only sixteen years old at the
time of the murder.7
The Supreme Court of Florida made its decision, that executing sixteen-
year-old offenders is cruel or unusual punishment, based on the number of
juvenile executions that have been carried out in Florida over the last
twenty-five years.8 The court concluded that executing sixteen-year-old
offenders is unusual and therefore a violation of article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution because no sixteen-year-old offenders have been
executed in Florida since 1972.9 The court did not examine jury
determinations or legislative enactments in making its decision as the United
States Supreme Court did in deciding the constitutionality of executing
fifteen and sixteen-year-old offenders in Thompson v. Oklahomal' and
Stanford v. Kentucky."
The purpose of this comment is to review the history of the juvenile
death penalty and to analyze the arguments surrounding Brennan v. State.12
Part II of this comment will discuss the history of the death penalty for
juveniles in the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of
Florida. Part M will analyze Brennan, including the appellate brief
arguments and the opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court of Florida.
Finally, Part IV will conclude this comment.
II. HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
A. United States Supreme Court
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court held that executing an
offender who is under sixteen years old at the time of their offense
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
4. Id. at S366.
5. Id. at S367.
6. Id. at S368.
7. Id.
8. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367.
9. Id.
10. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
11. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367-68.
12. 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (July 8, 1999).
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Amendment of the United States Constitution.13 In 1989, the Supreme Court
held that executing sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders does not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.1
4
Essentially, the United States Supreme Court has drawn a line at the age of
sixteen.' 5 The states may not cross this line, but are free to extend the line to
a higher age, making it illegal by statute to execute offenders sixteen and
older.
1. Thompson v. Oklahoma
On January 23, 1983, fifteen-year-old William Wayne Thompson
participated in the murder of Charles Keene, his former brother-in-law. 
s
Keene's body was found in a river two weeks later, chained to a concrete
block.17 It was determined that the victim had been shot twice and that his
throat, chest, and abdomen had been cut.'8 Thompson was certified to stand
trial as an adult in accordance with Oklahoma law.19 A jury found
Thompson guilty of first-degree murder and recommended the death
penalty.20 The trial judge sentenced Thompson to death.2' On appeal, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Thompson's conviction and
sentence.?
13. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. See also U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
14. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Note that the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment while
article 1, section 17 of the Florida Constitution prohibits cruel or unusual punishment.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, with FA. CONST. art. I, § 17. Also note that references to
a defendant's age in this comment refers to the defendant's age at the time of their offense.
15. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
16. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 860 (1988).
17. Id. at 861.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 861-62. Under title 10, section 1112(b) of the Oklahoma Statutes, juveniles
could be certified to stand trial as adults if the State could prove "prosecutive merit" of the
case and, after considering six factors, the court determined that there were no reasonable
prospects for rehabilitation of the child within the juvenile system. OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, §
1112(b) (1981). Numerous witnesses testified about Thompson's prior abusive behavior,
which included arrests for assault and battery, attempted burglary, assault and battery with a
knife, and assault and battery with a deadly weapon. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 861-62. A
clinical psychologist testified that the juvenile justice system could not help Thompson. Id.
20. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 862.
21. Id.
22. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 724 P.2d 780 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
2000]
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On certiorari, Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court held,
in a plurality opinion,23 that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-year-old
offenders constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 He held that "evolving
standards of decency" demonstrate that society opposes capital punishment
for offenders under sixteen,25 that imposing the death penalty on offenders
under sixteen is disproportional, and that imposing the death penalty on
offenders under sixteen does not serve the social purposes of capital
punishment.27  Hence, executing offenders under sixteen years of age
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.28
First, to determine what "evolving standards of decency" were in the
United States, Justice Stevens examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations. He concluded that state laws limiting the rights of fifteen-
23. Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Thompson was the swing vote, which helped
define the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-59. Although she concurred with Justice
Stevens' opinion, she was reluctant to adopt it without better evidence. Id. at 848-49. She
agreed with Justice Stevens, that statistics showing the rarity of executions imposed on
offenders under 16 years old support the inference of a national consensus opposing the death
penalty for 15-year-olds, but she said that the statistics are not dispositive. Id. at 853. Justice
O'Connor also agreed with Justice Stevens when he said adolescents are generally less
blameworthy than adults. Id. However, she said that fact does not necessarily mean all 15-
year-olds are incapable of the culpability that would justify imposing capital punishment on
them. Id. Finally, Justice O'Connor concluded that offenders under 16 should not be
executed under a capital punishment statute that fails to specify a minimum age at which one
may become eligible for the death penalty. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58.
Justice Scalia dissented, saying it is impossible for the plurality to hold, based on
legislative enactments, that evolving standards of decency demonstrate society's opposition to
imposing the death penalty on offenders younger than 16. Id. at 868. This is because 40% of
the states and the federal government allow for imposing the death penalty on any juvenile
tried as an adult. Id. On the subject of jury determinations as an indicator of "evolv-ing
standards of decency," Justice Scalia said that the plurality erroneously examined statistics on
capital executions, which are substantially lower than capital sentences. Id. at 869. Justice
Scalia concluded by saying, although statistics do indicate that imposing the death penalty on
offenders under 16 is rare, the Court is not discussing the rarity of capital punishment for
offenders under 16, but whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits it entirely. Id.
24. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838.
25. Id. at 824-25, 833.
26. Id. at 835.
27. Id. at 837-38.
28. Seeid.at838.
29. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-33. Courts are guided by "'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"' in determining what constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Id. at 821 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
[Vol. 24:855
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year-olds indicate that society regards fifteen-year-olds as less responsible
than adults.30 Using statistics, Justice Stevens determined that a majority of
the states as well as other countries oppose the death penalty for offenders
under sixteen years old, indicating that society was becoming less tolerant of
imposing capital punishment on juveniles.31  Finally, Justice Stevens said
that the rarity of executions of offenders under sixteen years old in the
United States indicates that juries oppose imposing capital punishment on
such offenders.
32
Next, Justice Stevens discussed the proportionality of the death penalty
and the death penalty's contribution to social purposes when imposed on
offenders under sixteen.33 He concluded that juveniles are less culpable than
adults are because they are less mature and less responsible than adults.
34
(1958)). Courts examine legislative enactments and jury determinations to determine what
evolving standards of decency are. Id. at 822-23. If evolving standards of decency indicate
that society opposes capital punishment for a certain age group, then executing an offender
who belongs to that age group constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 821-23 &
nn.4-7.
30. Id. at 823-25. At that time, no states allowed 15-year-olds to vote or sit on a jury;
in all but one state a 15-year-old could not drive without parental consent; in all but four states
a 15-year-old could not marry without parental consent; no state allowed 15-year-olds to
purchase pornographic material; all states had enacted legislation designating the maximum
age for juvenile court at 16 years old; and no states allowed 15-year-olds to purchase alcohol
or cigarettes. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824.
31. Id. at 826-31. At that time, 14 states did not allow capital punishment at all; 18
other states had expressly established a minimum age in their death penalty statutes at age 16
at the time of the offense; and in the remaining 19 states, the death penalty was allowed, but
no minimum age limit had been set. Id. The death penalty had been completely abolished in
West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all Scandinavian countries, and was
available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in most western countries, including
Canada, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Id.
32. Id. at 831. It is estimated that only 18-20 people under the age of 16 at the time
of their offense have been executed in the 20th Century, the last such execution taking place in
1948. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 832. "The road we have traveled during the past four
decades-in which thousands of juries have tried murder cases-leads to the unambiguous
conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now generally
abhorrent to the conscience of the community." Id.
33. Id. at 833-38.
34. Id. at 834-35. Justice Stevens wrote that because of less experience, less
education, and less intelligence, teenagers are less able to evaluate the consequences of their
conduct and are more apt to be motivated by emotion or peer pressure. Id. He cited to
Eddings v. Oklahoma, saying that crimes by juveniles deserve less punishment because
adolescents have less capacity to control their conduct and to think in long range terms than
adults. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16
(1982)). He went on to cite the REPORT OF THE TWENTETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORcE, 1978
REPORT ON SENTENCING PotucY TowARD YOUNG OFFENDERS (1978) [hereinafter 1978
2000]
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Therefore, imposing the death penalty on juveniles is disproportional and
hence a violation of the Eighth Amendment.35 Justice Stevens determined
that imposing the death penalty on offenders younger than sixteen years old
also does not contribute to the social purposes of the death penalty,
specifically, retribution and deterrence.36
2. Stanford v. Kentucky
Stanford v. Kentucky37 involved two consolidated cases.38 In the first
case, seventeen-year-old Kevin Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas
station where twenty-year-old Barbel Poore was working as an attendant.39
During and after commission of the robbery, Stanford and his accomplice
repeatedly raped and sodomized Poore before Stanford shot her in the face
and in the back of the head.40 At trial, a corrections officer testified that
Stanford said he killed Poore because she lived next door to him and would
41recognize him. Stanford was transferred and tried as an adult and was
convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy, first-degree robbery and receiving
42
stolen property. He was sentenced to death by the trial judge and his
sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.43
REPORT] saying that youth crime is not exclusively the offender's fault and that offenses by
youths represent a failure of family, school, and the social system. Id. at 834 (citing 1978
REPORT).
35. See id. at 833-35.
36. Id. at 836-38. Retribution is "'inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of
men' ... [gliven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teenager's capacity for
growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its children." Id. at 836-37 (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Justice Stevens said that making younger persons
ineligible for the death penalty will not diminish the deterrent value of capital punishment for
the vast majority of potential offenders because people under 16 are involved in only about
two percent of the arrests made for willful homicide. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837.
37. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
38. Id. at 364 (consolidating Stamford v. Kentucky, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987) with
Wilkins v. Missouri, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987)).
39. Id. at 365.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365-66. Under section 208.170 of the Kentucky Statutes, a
juvenile could be tried as an adult if the offender is either charged with a Class A felony or a
capital crime, or was over 16 and charged with a felony. KY. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 208.170
(Michie 1982). In this case, the juvenile court certified Stanford to be tried as an adult after
stressing the seriousness of his offense and the unsuccessful attempts of the juvenile system to
rehabilitate him for numerous instances of past delinquency. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365.
43. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
860 [Vol. 24:855
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In the second case, sixteen-year-old Heath Wilkins robbed a
convenience store owned and operated by Nancy and David Allen.44 His
plan was to rob the store and kill whoever was working there because "a
dead person can't talk."'45 During the robbery, Wilkins stabbed Nancy Allen,
a twenty-six-year-old mother of two, while his accomplice held her." Allen
spoke up to assist the two when they had trouble opening the cash register.47
This led Wilkins to stab her three more times in the chest, two of the wounds
puncturing the victim's heart.48 When Allen began to beg for her life,
Wilkins stabbed her in the throat four times, severing her carotid artery.49
Wilkins was certified to stand trial as an adult and was sentenced to death.5°
The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed on review, rejecting Wilkins'
51Eighth Amendment argument.
On certiorari, Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court held, in
52
a plurality opinion, that imposing capital punishment on sixteen or
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ld. at 366.
48. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 367. Under section 211.021(1) of the Missouri Statutes, for Wilkins to be
tried as an adult, the juvenile court was required to terminate juvenile jurisdiction and certify
him under section 211.071. See Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 211.021(1), 211.071 (1986). That section
allowed individuals between 14 and 17 who committed felonies to be tried as adults. See id.
The juvenile court in this case certified Wilkins relying on the viciousness and violence of the
crime, the defendant's maturity, and the juvenile system's inability to rehabilitate Wilkins
after previous delinquency. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367.
51. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368.
52. Justice O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, concluded, "no national consensus
forbids the imposition of capital punishment" on 16 or 17-year-old offenders. Id. at 381. She
cited Thompson saying that the most relevant statistic in this case is that every American
jurisdiction that has set a minimum age for capital punishment has set it at 16 years old or
above. Id. at 381 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 849 (1988)).
In Justice Brennan's dissent, he examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations to determine whether "evolving standards of decency" oppose the juvenile
death penalty. Id. at 382-93. He concluded that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is
"unusual" and therefore unconstitutional because statistics show that juveniles account for
only about two percent of total executions in the United States. Id. at 386-87. Justice
Brennan said that imposing the death penalty on 16 or 17-year-old offenders is
disproportionate because, in his view, juveniles so generally lack the degree of responsibility
for their crimes, that the Eighth Amendment forbids that they receive it. Stanford, 492 U.S. at
394-96. He claimed, although individualized consideration exists in capital sentencing, it
does not guarantee that immature individuals undeserving of the death penalty will not be
sentenced to death. Id. at 397. Finally, Justice Brennan concluded that since juveniles are
2000]
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seventeen-year-old offenders does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.53 In arriving at that conclusion, Justice Scalia, like Justice
Stevens in Thompson, examined legislative enactments and jury
determinations to determine what "evolving standards of decency" were in
the United States. 4 He concluded that legislative enactments and jury
determinations indicate that society does not oppose imposing the death
penalty on sixteen or seventeen-year-old offenders.55  Justice Scalia
determined that laws limiting the rights of sixteen and seventeen-year-olds
are not proof that it is "categorically unacceptable" to prosecutors and juries
to execute minors.56 Those laws operate in gross and apply to all
individuals.57 However, death penalty statutes provide for individualized
consideration of each individual person sentenced to death.5 8  An
individual's maturity is appropriately used as a mitigating factor rather than
a complete bar to the death penalty. 9
Justice Scalia stressed the Court's responsibility to look to the concepts
of decency of modem American society as a whole rather than the Court's
own concepts of decency in determining what evolving standards of decency
were in America. He determined that the degree of national consensus,
which is sufficient to label a particular punishment cruel and unusual, had
not been established in this case.6 1 Essentially, Justice Scalia held that the
less culpable than adults, they cannot be executed to satisfy the social purpose of retribution.
Id. at 403-04.
53. Id. at 380.
54. Id. at 368-74.
55. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380.
56. Id. at 374.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 375.
59. Id.
60. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369. Justice Scalia emphasized in footnote one that
American standards of decency are dispositive, rejecting the plurality's examination of
sentencing practices in other countries to determine evolving standards of decency in
Thompson. Id. at 369 n.1. Justice Scalia wrote that the sentencing practices of other nations
cannot be used to establish the Eighth Amendment prerequisite that the punishment in
question is accepted among Americans. Id.
61. Id. at 370-72. Fifteen out of 37 states declined to impose the death penalty on 16-
year-old offenders and 12 out of 37 declined to impose it on 17-year-old offenders. Id. at 370.
Justice Scalia compared and contrasted these numbers to cases where the Supreme Court
invalidated the death penalty. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 371-72. In Coker v. Georgia, the
Supreme Court struck down capital punishment for the crime of rape holding that Georgia was
the only jurisdiction that authorized such a punishment. Id. at 371 (citing Coker v. Georgia,
[Vol. 24:855
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petitioners did not meet their heavy burden of establishing a national
consensus against capital punishment for people sixteen or seventeen years
old at the time of their offense.62
Justice Scalia concluded that the petitioners' argument, that juries'
reluctance to impose the death penalty on sixteen and seventeen-year-old
offenders is poof of contemporary society's opposition to such punishment,
was not supported by evidence because the statistics used by the petitioners
carried little significance. 63 He determined that since there are far fewer
capital crimes committed by juveniles, that there are also far fewer
executions of juveniles.64 Justice Scalia concluded by saying that the small
number of juvenile executions does not mean that society views those
executions as categorically unacceptable, but instead, society views
imposing the death penalty on individuals under eighteen as something that
should be done only in rare instances.6
Justice Scalia called it "absurd to think that one must be mature enough
to drive carefully, to drink responsibly, or to vote intelligently, in order to be
mature enough to understand that murdering another human being is
433 U.S. 584, 595-96 (1977)). In Enmund v. Florida, the Supreme Court struck down capital
punishment for a crime in which an accomplice took a life, emphasizing that only eight
jurisdictions authorized similar punishment. Id. at 371 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 792 (1982)). The Court in Stanford noted the Court in Ford v. Wainwright struck down
capital punishment of the insane saying that '"no State in the Union' ... permitted such
punishment."' Id. at 371 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986)). However,
Justice Scalia likens Stanford to Tison v. Arizona, where the Supreme Court upheld
imposition of capital punishment for major participation in a felony with reckless indifference
to human life, noting that only 11 jurisdictions out of those allowing capital punishment
rejected its use under such circumstances. Id. at 371-72 (citing Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 154 (1987)).
62. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-73.
63. Id. at 373-74 (citing VICTOR L. STREIm, IMPOSITION OF DEATH SENTENCES FOR
JUVENILE OFFENSES, JAN. 1, 1982-APR. 1, 1989, PAPER FOR CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE
OF LAW (1989)). The current version of Victor L. Streib's report is entitled THE JUVENILE
DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JAN.
1973-JUNE 1999 and is available on the World Wide Web at <www.law.onu.edu/faculty/
streib/juvdeath.htm>. Actual executions for crimes committed by those under age 18 made up
only two percent of the total number of executions that occurred between 1642 and 1986.
Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373-74 (citing VICTOR L. STREIB, IMPOSrrON OF DEATH SENTENCES FOR
JUvENILE OFFENSES, JAN. 1, 1982-APR. 1, 1989, PAPER FOR CLEVELAND MARSHALL COLLEGE
OF LAW (1989)). Between 1982 and 1986, out of a total of 2,106 death sentences, only 15
were imposed on people 16 or under at the time of their offense, and only 30 on people who
were 17 at the time of their offense. Id.
64. Stanford, 492 U.S. 373-74.
65. Id.
2000]
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profoundly wrong, and to conform one's conduct to that most minimal of all
civilized standards." 66 He held that statutes proscribing minors from
drinking, smoking, etc., make determinations in gross about an individual's
maturity.67 Essentially, those statutes are necessary to our society because it
would be impossible to examine every person individually to determine
whether they are mature enough to drink or drive or smoke cigarettes.(8
However, when imposing the death penalty, states are required to
individually consider the maturity of the defendant.6 9 Therefore, Justice
Scalia held that the existence of statutes limiting the rights of juveniles does
not support the argument that all juveniles are too immature to realize that
murdering another person is wrong.70
B. Supreme Court of Florida
Individual states are bound by the decisions in Thompson and Stanford
and, therefore, may not execute offenders under sixteen years old. However,
they may extend the line drawn by the United States Supreme Court by
legislative enactment. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida decided that it
is constitutional under article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution to
execute seventeen-year-old offenders in Florida.7' Then, in 1994, the
Supreme Court of Florida decided that executing fifteen-year-old offenders
72is unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution.
1. LeCroy v. State
On January 11, 1981, the bodies of John and Gail Hardeman were
found in a remote area of Palm Beach County where they had been camping
and hunting a week earlier.73 John died from a single shotgun wound to the
head and Gail died from three small caliber gunshot wounds to the chest,
neck, and head.74 When Gall's body was found her trousers had been
unzipped and her brassiere had been partially removed. 75 John's wallet, a
66. Id. at 374.
67. Id. at 374-75.
68. See id. at 374.
69. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374-75.
70. Id. at 374.
71. See LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750 (Fla. 1988).
72. See Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994).
73. See LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752.
74. Id.
75. Id.
[Vol. 24:855
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.30-06 hunting rifle, and Gail's .38 revolver were all missing from the
scene.76 Seventeen-year-old Cleo LeCroy ("LeCroy") and his brother Jon
("Jon"), who had been camping in the area with their parents, assisted in the
search for the victims.77 During the search, the brothers claimed to be great
trackers, and said that if the police let them search alone that they would find
78the bodies. Jon found Gail's body, the first body discovered, in the
presence of police officers.7 9 The brothers were questioned by the police
immediately after discovery of the both bodies.' ° LeCroy waived his
Miranda rights and gave two statements to the police, in which he admitted
killing the couple.81 At trial, significant evidence was introduced
demonstrating that LeCroy murdered John and Gail. 2  The jury
recommended life for John's murder and death for Gail's murder.83 The trial
judge agreed with the jury's recommendations on both murder counts.84 On
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 752-53. In his first statement, LeCroy said that he killed John by accident
when he fired his gun at a hog and his bullet ricocheted striking John in the head. Id. at 752.
Regarding Gail, LeCroy's first statement changed three times: first, he said that he killed Gail
when she burst on the scene and he did not know who she was; next, he said that she fired at
him first; and finally, that he killed her to eliminate a witness. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 752. He
denied touching the bodies or taking anything from them. Id. LeCroy said that he told his
brother Jon what had happened, but that Jon had nothing to do with the killings. Id. at 752-
53. After giving his first statement, LeCroy asked almost immediately to give another
statement. Id. at 753. He waived his Miranda rights again. Id. In his next statement, LeCroy
told police that he shot Gail after she came on the scene yelling, and that he unzipped Gail's
trousers to check for a pulse. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 753. He also stated that he did take the
guns belonging to John and Gail. Id.
82. Id. At trial, LeCroy's girlfriend testified that LeCroy told her about the killings
and taking the money and guns from the victims and that he sold the rifle to an acquaintance,
which was later recovered by the police. Id. She also testified that LeCroy told her that he
burned a pair of his pants because they had blood on them and that he planned to mutilate the
barrel of his .22 to prevent identification. Id. Weapons experts testified that the barrel of
LeCroy's .22 had been mutilated. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 753. A jail mate testified that
LeCroy admitted the killings. Id. Contrary to LeCroy's statements, the medical examiner
testified that the shots fired at Gail were fired at point blank range, and in two of them, the gun
was probably in contact with her body. Id.
83. Id. at 755.
84. Id.
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appeal, LeCroy argued that the death penalty imposed on a seventeen-year-
85
old is cruel and unusual punishment.
Writing for the majority86 in LeCroy, Justice Shaw held that there is no
constitutional bar to imposing the death penalty on seventeen-year-old
offenders in Florida.87 He began by indicating that the sentencing judge
gave great weight to the appellant's youth as a mitigating factor, yet the
judge found that the appellant was mentally and emotionally mature and
understood the difference between right and wrong and the nature and
consequences of his actions. 88  Next, Justice Shaw noted that legislative
action in Florida over the last thirty-five years had consistently evolved
toward treating juveniles who commit serious offenses as adults, and since
1951, the legislature had repeatedly handled juveniles charged with capital
crimes "in every respect as adults." 89 Then, the court noted that the jury
85. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756.
86. Justice Barkett concurred in the majority's finding of guilt, but dissented as to the
sentence because he believed that imposing the death penalty on a 17-year-old offender
violates both the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 17
of the Florida Constitution. Id. at 758. He concluded that legal disabilities imposed on
minors indicate that youthful offenders have not fully developed the ability to judge or
consider the consequences of their behavior. Id. He said "[w]hen a government withholds the
right of a citizen to enjoy certain benefits and privileges because of immaturity and lack of
judgment, then for the same reason it also should withhold the imposition of the ultimate and
final penalty, which can be imposed only where there is heightened culpability." Id. at 759.
Justice Barkett agreed with Justice O'Connor's reasoning in her concurrence in Thompson
when she said that the death penalty should not be imposed on an individual under 16 years
old pursuant to the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum
age. Id. at 760 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857-58 (1988)). Finally, Justice
Barkett concluded, saying Florida's legislature must address the statutory minimum age issue
before it continues to allow execution of juveniles. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 760.
87. Id. at 758.
88. Id. at 756.
89. Id. at 756-57. Florida law recognizes distinctions between juveniles and adults,
however "section 39.02(5)(c), Florida Statutes (1979-1987), mandates that a child of any age
charged with a capital crime 'shall be tried and handled in every respect as if he were an
adult."' Id. at 756 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1979-1987)) (emphasis in original).
The court in LeCroy said that the words "in every respect" can only be read as a declaration of
legislative intent that offenders under 18 may be subject to the same penalty as adults,
including the death penalty. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756-57. Legislative history in Florida has
consistently shown strong support for treating juveniles as adults when they are involved in
serious crimes. Id. Prior to 1950, the Florida Constitution vested jurisdiction over all
criminal charges against minors in criminal courts. Id. at 756. There were no juvenile courts
and all juveniles were tried as adults. Id. In 1950, the Florida Constitution was amended,
essentially creating the juvenile court system. Id. This was codified as chapter 39 of the
Florida Statutes. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1951)). Under this
[Vol. 24:855
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recommended the death penalty for Gail's murder, but not for John's
murder, concluding that the jury was able to distinguish between the more
aggravated murder of Gail.9 "This reflects a community judgment that in
this particular case, under these circumstances and for this defendant, the
death penalty is appropriate." 91 Justice Shaw determined that the cases cited
by LeCroy indicating the rarity at which the death penalty is imposed on
minors in Florida does not prove that there is a per se rule against imposing
the death penalty on juveniles?9 Instead, Judge Shaw determined that the
cases citred demonstrated that minors convicted of first-degree murder tend
to "exhibit immaturity or other mitigating characteristics which persuade
juries and sentencing judges that the death penalty is inappropriate in their
specific cases." 93 Essentially, the court concluded: 1) LeCroy's maturity
was considered as a mitigating factor and he was found to be a mature
individual; 2) Florida law has evolved toward treating violent juvenile
offenders as adults; and 3) the rarity of juvenile executions does not create a
statute violations of law committed by a child, then defined as individuals under 17 years of
age, were removed from criminal courts and placed in either juvenile courts or in county
courts in those counties without juvenile courts. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1951)). Section
39.02(6) of the Florida Statutes gave the juvenile court discretion to transfer felony charges
against juveniles 14 or older to criminal courts, except when juveniles age 16 commit a crime
which would be a capital offense if committed by an adult, in which case the juvenile "shall be
[sic] transferred." Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1951)). In 1955, the legislature amended
section 39.02(6), deleting "sixteen years or older" and providing that any child, irrespective of
age, indicted for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment by a grand jury shall be
tried in a criminal court. Id. at 756-57 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1955)). That section
was further amended in 1967 providing that the juvenile court shall be without jurisdiction
and the child shall be handled in every respect as if he were an adult whenever an indictment
is returned by a grand jury charging a child of any age with a violation of Florida law
punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(6) (1969)). In 1973,
chapter 39 was substantially rewritten returning exclusive original jurisdiction of charges
against juvepiles to the circuit court. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 757 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39
(1973)). The court could then try any juvenile fourteen years old or older as an adult on any
criminal offense. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39 (1973)). A child was redefined as anyone under
18 years of age. Id. In 1978, chapter 39 was rewritten providing that any child tried as an
adult would be subject to prosecution, trial, and sentencing as an adult. Id. (citing FLA. STAT.
§ 39 (Supp. 1978)). Finally in 1981, the legislature further amended chapter 39 providing that
if a juvenile was convicted of any crime punishable by life in prison or death, that the child
"shall be sentenced as an adult." Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.02(5)(c) (1981)).
90. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 757.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 757.
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per se rule banning juvenile capital punishment.94  Based on these
conclusions the court held that there is no constitutional ban against
imposing the death penalty on seventeen-year-old offenders in Florida.95
2. Allen v. State
On December 10, 1990, fifteen-year-old Jerome Allen and two
accomplices stole a car, robbed a gas station, and, during the robbery, shot
one of the gas station's employees, Stephen DuMont.96 DuMont died from
the shotgun wound. However, before dying, he was able to describe his
assailants and the car that they drove.9 Deputies apprehended Allen and
searched his house where they found a sawed-off shotgun and ammunition.
98
However, experts could not say whether DuMont had been killed with the
gun that was recovered. 99  The jury found Allen guilty of first-degree
murder, among other violent crimes.10 During the penalty phase, one of
Allen's accomplices testified that although Allen did not shoot DuMont, he
was the one who urged the other accomplice to do so to prevent being
identified.'0 1 The jury recommended the death penalty on a seven-to-five
vote.102 During the sentencing hearing, a forensic psychologist testified that
Allen had a traumatic, chaotic childhood, that his father violently attacked
him on occasion, and that Allen suffered from behavioral and learning
disorders. 103 The psychologist also noted that Allen suffered head trauma
that may have resulted in organic brain injury or neurological problems, and
that he had a low Intelligence Quotient.1°4 Allen's mother testified that
Allen sometimes went into a daze and often suffered from fainting spells.1
0 5
The trial court sentenced Allen to death.'06
94. See id. at 756-57.
95. LeCroy, 533 So. 2d at 756-57.
96. See Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494,495 (Fla. 1994).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 496.
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The court held, per curiam,0 7 that because the death penalty is hardly
ever imposed on fifteen-year-old offenders, it is either cruel or unusual
punishment if imposed on offenders who are under the age of sixteen at the
time of the crime.1t0 Therefore, the court concluded that the death penalty is
prohibited for fifteen-year-olds by article I, section 17 of the Florida
Constitution.1 9 "We cannot countenance a rule that would result in some
young juveniles being executed while the vast majority of others are not,
even where the crimes are similar."110
Im. BRENNAN v. STATE
A. Facts and Procedural History
Sixteen-year-old Keith Brennan and eighteen-year-old Joshua Nelson
wanted to leave the city of Cape Coral, so they devised a plan to steal
Tommy Owens' car."' On March 10, 1995 they lured Owens to a remote
spot, and began to beat Owens with a baseball bat.112 Owens pleaded with
Nelson and Brennan for his life and told them to take his car, but after a
discussion Nelson and Brennan decided to kill Owens to avoid being caught
by the police.1 After tying Owens up, Brennan cut Owens' throat with a
box cutter knife. 14 Owens remained conscious during the stabbing and
begged Nelson to hit him again with the bat so that he would be knocked
107. In his special concurrence, Justice Overton said that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Thompson demands that the Supreme Court of Florida hold that executing
a 15-year-old is unconstitutional. Id. at 498. He stated that under the Florida Constitution,
the proper constitutional dividing line is under the age of 16. Id.
In his special concurrence, Justice Grimes agreed with Justice Overton, that Thompson
demands that the court rule that it is unconstitutional to execute one under 16 years of age. Id.
However, he said he was unwilling to accept the notion that the Florida Constitution prohibits
imposing the death penalty upon a person below the age of 16 under all circumstances. Id.
108. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
109. Id. (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)). At that time, more
than a half century had passed since Florida last executed an offender younger than 16. Id.
Since then only two death penalties have been imposed on such individuals, and both were
overturned. See Ross v. State, 386 So. 2d 1191 (Fla. 1980); Vasil v. State, 374 So. 2d 465
(Fla. 1979).
110. Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
111. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S365 (July 8, 1999).
112. Id.
113. Nelson v. State, 748 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1999).
114. Id.
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unconscious before the stabbing continued.115  Nelson complied with
Owens' request; he and Brennan continued to strike Owens with the bat.'
1 6
After the beating and stabbing, Nelson and Brennan dragged Owens' body
under nearby bushes. 1 7 They then picked up Tina Porth and Misty Porth in
Owens' car, and drove to New Jersey after stopping in Daytona Beach. 1 8
Law enforcement officers later apprehended Nelson and Brennan in New
Jersey.
1 19
Brennan was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, first-
degree felony murder, and robbery with a deadly weapon. 20 The Porth
sisters testified that, during the trip, Nelson and Brennan informed them that
they had killed Owens.12  Brennan gave a taped confession in which he
admitted his involvement in the murder but denied that there was any prior
plan to kill Owens. 122 The confession was played to the jury during trial and
Brennan was found guilty on all three counts.1
23
At the time of the crime, Brennan was a sophomore in high school. 24
He had no significant history of prior criminal activity and his juvenile
records showed only prior crimes against property.1l 5 During the penalty
phase, Brennan presented evidence that his mother committed suicide when
he was two years old, that she suffered from severe depression, and that he
had been institutionalized.126 He also presented evidence that he was
sexually molested by his older brother when he was eight and was allegedly
"picked on" by others. 127 In 1993, he received inpatient care for alcohol and
drug addiction. 128
The jury recommended the death penalty by a vote of eight-to-four after
hearing all the evidence.129 Among the aggravators, the trial judge found
that "the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" and "the
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S365-66.
123. Id. at S366.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S366.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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capital felony was committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner
without any pretense of legal or moral justification." 130 The trial judge also
considered six statutory mitigators and twenty-five nonstatutory
mitigators. Age as a statutory mitigator was given great weight, while the
statutory mitigator of lack of significant criminal history was given moderate
weight. Although the trial judge gave significant weight to Brennan's
young age and his lack of significant prior criminal history, the court
concluded that he "wielded a baseball bat and [a] box cutter to murder
another young man.' 33 The trial court followed the jury's recommendation
and sentenced Brennan to death for the first-degree premeditated murder
charge.
134
B. Appellate BriefArguments
1. Appellant's Initial Brief
Brennan's primary argument with respect to the constitutionality of the
juvenile death penalty was that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-year-
old Brennan constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment in violation of
article I, section 17 of the Florida Constitution and the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 35  This was
"Issue r' of Brennan's argument.136 Brennan adopted the rationale set forth
in Allen,' 37 which said that executing a sixteen-year-old is a violation of
article I, section 17 of Florida's Constitution because executing such a
person is "unusual" due to the rarity of executions of sixteen-year-olds in
Florida. Brennan indicated that in the last twenty-five years only three
other sixteen-year-olds were sentenced to death in Florida, and none of them
were executed.139 He concluded that imposing the ultimate penalty on only
130. Id.
131. Id. at S373 n.2.
132. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S366.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Appellant's Initial Brief at 24, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
136. Id.
137. Id. at25. SeeAllen, 636 So. 2d at 494.
138. Appellant's Initial Brief at 25-29. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 17.
139. Appellant's Initial Brief at 27-28. In each case, the offender was re-sentenced to
life in prison. See Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Morgan v. State, 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394
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one sixteen-year-old in twenty-five years is "cruel, unusual, and
disproportional" and is prohibited by the Florida Constitution and the United
States Constitution.40
2. Appellee's Answer Brief
In its answer brief, the State argued that Brennan failed to meet his
heavy burden of demonstrating that imposing the death penalty on sixteen-
year-old offenders is cruel and/or unusual under article I, section 17 of the
Florida Constitution or under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.14 The State began its argument by stressing that
in Stanford, the United States Supreme Court has already rejected Brennan's
argument-that it is cruel and unusual to execute a sixteen-year-old.' 42 The
State especially stressed the fact that Brennan was only eight days short of
being seventeen when he killed Owens.143  Next, the State addressed
Brennan's use of Allen in its argument, which said that it is unconstitutional
to execute a sixteen-year-old in Florida because no sixteen-year-old
offenders who have been sentenced to death in the last twenty-five years
have been executed.144 In response, the State argued that no one under
twenty has been executed in Florida in the last twenty-five years either.
45
"Surely this does not mean that the death penalty cannot be imposed on
anyone nineteen or younger."'146 The State then argued that Brennan's
argument finds no support in legislative enactments because legislative
enactments in Florida have "consistently evolved toward treating juveniles
charged with serious offenses as if they were adult criminal defendants."' 47
Then, the State said that Brennan's argument, that the death penalty has not
been carried out on a sixteen-year-old offender in the last twenty-five years,
is not as important as how many times it has been imposed, which has been
(Fla. 1984); Morgan v. State, 392 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981); Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616
(Fla. 1979).
140. Appellant's Initial Brief at 28.
141. Appellee's Answer Brief at 9, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
142. Id. at 5 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989)).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 6.
145. Id.
146. Appellee's Answer Brief at 6.
147. Id. at 7 (quoting LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 757 (Fla. 1988)). See supra
note 89.
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seven times in the last twenty-five years.1a The State stressed that none of
the other sixteen-year-olds had their sentence reduced based solely on their
age.
49
3. Appellant's Reply Brief
Brennan began his reply brief by indicating that the issue of imposing
the death penalty on a sixteen-year-old offender has not been addressed or
resolved in Florida (although it was decided in the United States Supreme
Court); the court in Farina avoided that issue.150 Brennan then argued that
Allen supports the inference that rarity of executions of a particular age
group demonstrates that it is cruel or unusual punishment to execute
members of that age group and that such execution is prohibited by the
Florida Constitution. 5 He said that although the State cited Stanford for the
proposition that the federal constitution does not prohibit execution of a
sixteen-year-old, that case has never been cited by a Florida appellate
court.
152
C. Analysis of Brennan v. State
1. Justice Shaw Announced the Judgment of the Court
The majority of the court held that imposing the death penalty on
Brennan, for a crime committed when he was sixteen years of age, would
constitute cruel or unusual punishment in violation of article I, section 17 of
the Florida Constitution.15 3 In arriving at that conclusion the Supreme Court
of Florida was guided by the holding in Allen, which said that imposing the
death penalty on a fifteen-year-old would be cruel or unusual punishment
under the Florida Constitution because it is almost never imposed on fifteen-
year-olds in Florida.' 54 Essentially, the court in Brennan determined that
148. Appellee's Answer Brief at 8. Henry Brown (one time), James Morgan (four
times), James Farina (one time so far), and Brennan. Id.
149. Id. at 8-9.
150. Appellant's Reply Brief at 1, Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365 (1999)
(No. 90-279).
151. Id. (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1994)).
152. Id. at 1-2.
153. Brennan v. State, 24 Fla. L. Weekly S365, S368 (July 8, 1999).
154. See id. at S367 (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994)). Allen
held that over a half century had passed since a 15-year-old was executed in Florida, and that
whatever the reasons for the rarity of such executions that the court could not "countenance a
2000]
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sixteen-year-olds are executed so rarely (a sixteen-year-old has not been
executed in Florida since 1940) that the court is compelled to adopt the same
conclusion arrived at in Allen.155 The court rejected the State's argument
that executing a juvenile was no different than executing a woman since both
are so uncommon, saying that the law itself recognizes that children are not
as responsible for their acts as are adults.
56
The majority then attacked the State's argument, that it is constitutional
to execute a sixteen-year-old offender in Florida because the United States
Supreme Court has already decided that it is constitutional to execute such
an offender in Stanford.157 The court said that, to the contrary, the Stanford
opinion supports the determination that imposing the death penalty on
sixteen-year-old offenders in Florida is unconstitutional. 58  The court
arrived at that conclusion saying that the plurality in Stanford concluded that
the constitutionality of capital punishment statutes depends on the
individualized consideration given to the defendant's circumstances, and that
Florida statutes are devoid of any such individualized consideration. 5 9 The
majority in Brennan argued that, in Stanford, the plurality determined that
juvenile transfer statutes ensure consideration of a defendant's individual
maturity and moral responsibility. 6° Based on that cite from Stanford, the
Supreme Court of Florida held in Brennan that it is unconstitutional to
execute a juvenile under Florida law because section 985.225(1)(a) of the
Florida Statutes neither sets a minimum age for the death penalty nor sets
forth criteria to ensure individualized consideration of the defendant's
maturity and moral responsibility.'
6
'
rule that would result in some young juveniles being executed while the vast majority of
others are not, even where the crimes are similar." Allen, 636 So. 2d at 497.
155. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367. The court in Brennan said that the last
reported case where the death penalty was imposed and carried out on a 16-year-old defendant
was in Clay v. State, 196 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1940), which was over 55 years ago. Id. The court
also noted that in the last 25 years, only three other 16-year-old defendants were sentenced to
death and none of those sentences were carried out. Id. See also, supra note 139.
156. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367 (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497
(Fla. 1994)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989)). The Kentucky and
Missouri statutes considered in Stanford specifically provided for individualized consideration
before transferring juveniles to be tried as adults. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375 n.6.
161. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S367-68. Section 985.225(l)(a) of the
Florida Statutes provides that a child of any age may be indicted for a capital crime and shall
[Vol. 24:855
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The Legislature's failure to impose a minimum age, the
legislative mandate that a child of any age indicted for a capital
crime shall be subject to the death penalty, and the failure to set up
a system through our juvenile transfer statutes that "ensure[s]
individualized consideration of the maturity and moral
responsibility" render our statutory scheme suspect under the
federal constitution and the reasoning of Stanford as it applies to
sixteen-year-old offenders.
1 62
Finally, the court noted that a proportionality analysis requires the court
to compare the totality of the circumstances of the case at hand with other
capital cases (similar defendants, facts, and sentences). 163  The court
concluded that the inherent problem of upholding the death penalty in
Brennan is highlighted by the fact that the death penalty has not been upheld
for any other defendant who was sixteen at the time of the crime, i.e., there
are no similar cases to compare it to.164 Therefore, the court declined to
conduct a proportionality analysis.
65
Essentially, since the death penalty is almost never imposed on
defendants who are Brennan's age, and when imposed in the last twenty-five
years the sentence has been subsequently vacated, the court decided that it
could not impose the death penalty on Brennan consistently with Florida's
case law and constitution.'6 The death sentence was therefore vacated and
reduced to life imprisonment without a possibility of parole.
167
2. Justice Anstead Specially Concurred
Justice Anstead concurred in the majority's opinion and noted the
soundness of the court's reasoning based on its holding in
Allen. 168 However, Justice Anstead wrote a separate opinion because he
believes in an alternative basis for holding that it is unconstitutional to
be handled in every respect as an adult including sentencing. FLA. STAT. § 985.225(l)(a)
(1999).
162. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S368 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,
375 (1989)).
163. See id. (citing Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167, 169 (Fla. 1991)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494,497 (Fla. 1994)).
167. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S368.
168. Id. (Anstead, J., concurring).
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execute a juvenile sixteen years of age in the state of Florida. 169 He based
his argument on "society's traditional values" and examined the rights
society has historically prescribed to children. 17° He concluded that "based
upon the enormous value we place on our children, and our historically
consistent treatment of children differently from adults for virtually all legal
purposes, but especially for purposes of assessing responsibility and meting
out punishment for criminal acts, that the constitutional line should be drawn
at age seventeen. ' 71  Justice Anstead determined that our laws have
consistently shown that a person only becomes sufficiently mature to accept
the responsibilities and privileges of adulthood at age eighteen. 172 That line,
he said is consistent with our traditional attitude towards children and
represents our "determination not to give up on our children."'
73
Justice Anstead continued, stressing that we must stand by the line we
have already drawn, which is at seventeen, even when it becomes difficult to
do so as in a case where a horrible crime has been committed by a
juvenile. 74 He said that "in standing firm we demonstrate the strength of
our commitment to our children" and then quoted Justice Barkett in LeCroy,
when he said, "[w]hen a government withholds the right of a citizen to enjoy
certain benefits and privileges because of immaturity and lack of judgment,
then for the same reason it also should withhold the imposition of the
ultimate and final penalty, which can be imposed only where there is
heightened culpability.' 75 Justice Anstead concluded saying that to allow
169. Id.
170. See id.
171. Id. "'Florida law protects seventeen-year-olds and those who are younger,
treating them as minors and children."' Brennan, Fla. L. Weekly at S374 n.14 (quoting
LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 759 (Fla. 1988) (citing FLA. STAT. §§ 1.01(14), 39.01(7)
(1987)). For example, an unmarried 17-year-old cannot vote, serve on a jury, etc. See FLA.
STAT. §§ 1.01(13), 39.01(12) (1999).
172. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369.
It is no coincidence, for example, that we use the age of eighteen as the cutoff
for child dependency and for the legal requirement of parents to take care of
their children, as well as a dividing line for a countless number of other legal
distinctions based upon a firmly established public policy of placing
limitations upon and extending special protections to the young and
immature.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. (quoting LeCroy v. State, 533 So. 2d 750, 759 (Fla. 1988) (Barkett, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
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capital punishment of juveniles below eighteen years old would be hypocrisy
and would destroy society's values.
176
3. Chief Justice Harding Concurred in Part and Dissented in Part
Chief Justice Harding concurred with Brennan's conviction but
dissented as to his sentence.177 He said that although he concurred in the
Allen decision and its reasoning, he now believes it to be flawed.178 Chief
Justice Harding now believes that this issue should be resolved based on
Florida's legislative history on the subject as suggested in Stanford.179 He
concluded that an analysis of the unusual element should include more than
just asking how often the death penalty is imposed.180
Chief Justice Harding pointed out several problems with the reasoning
in Allen, which was adopted by the majority in this case. 18' First he noted
that the Allen standard does not allow for a change in public opinion on the
issue because once the standard is put in place it can never be changed if
182
citizens change their minds. Essentially, once a punishment is held to be
"unusual," it will not be imposed anymore and will remain "unusual"
forever.183 The second flaw results if the state decides to alter its method of
execution.184 Under Allen, the first time a new method of punishment is used
it will be considered unusual and thus subject to constitutional scrutiny since
it has never been used before.185
Chief Justice Harding then cited to the concurring opinions in Allen,
written by Justice Grimes and Justice Overton, which provided that the issue186
of executing sixteen-year-olds is controlled by Thompson. Chief Justice
Harding agreed with Justice Grimes' and Justice Overton's opinion and said
that because there is no federal constitutional bar against executing a
sixteen-year-old offender, the better way to resolve this issue in Florida is to
determine whether the legislature has spoken on the subject.1 7 Chief Justice
176. See Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369.
177. Id. (Harding, C.L, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
178. See id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S369-71.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Id. at S369-70.
185. Id.
186. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
187. Id.
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Harding then examined the legislative history of the juvenile death penalty in
Florida by focusing on the information set forth in LeCroy. 18 He concluded
that Florida's legislative history reveals a distinct cutoff line between
offenders that are sixteen and older and those younger than sixteen. 8 9
Chief Justice Harding then compared the rationale in LeCroy to the
rationale in Allen concluding that the two opinions are in conflict. 19° In
Allen the court concluded that juveniles are treated differently than adults. 191
Under Florida law, a juvenile is defined as any unmarried person who has
not yet reached the age of eighteen. 92 Chief Justice Harding determined that
under the logic of Allen, all juveniles, including seventeen-year-olds, fall
into the purview of the Allen test.193 The majority in Brennan and in Allen
said that no fifteen or sixteen-year-old offenders have been executed in over
twenty-five years and therefore, it is unconstitutional to execute such
offenders.194 However, no seventeen-year-olds have been executed in over
twenty-five years either.' 95 Thus it seems that the holding in Allen would
prevent a seventeen-year-old offender from being executed, despite LeCroy's
holding to the contrary.
196
Chief Justice Harding determined that since the courts in LeCroy and
Stanford based their decisions on legislative enactments, that the reasoning
in those cases is more persuasive than Allen.197  He determined that
according to current figures, the contemporary consensus is very similar to
that of 1989 when Stanford was decided. 98 Since 1989, two more states
have actually altered their laws to allow for capital punishment of sixteen-
year-olds bringing that number to a total of twenty-four states out of forty
188. Id. See also supra note 89.
189. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 985.03(7) (1999).
193. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S370.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at S371. LeCroy and Stanford examined legislative enactments to determine
what society viewed as acceptable punishment, while Allen examined the number of
executions of 16-year-olds. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-77 (1989); LeCroy v.
State, 533 So. 2d 750, 756-57 (Fla. 1988); Allen v. State, 636 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. 1994).
Chief Justice Harding is essentially saying that legislative enactments in Florida over the last
50 years are a better indicia of what society considers to be acceptable punishment rather than
tallying the number of 16-year-olds executed over the last 25 years. Brennan, 24 Fla. L.
Weekly at S371.
198. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
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that allow capital punishment. 199 Those figures reaffirm the holdings in
Stanford and also LeCroy, that there is no consensus against executing
sixteen-year-old offenders."
Chief Justice Harding finally argued that in attempting to distinguish
Stanford from this case, the majority relied on only one single aspect of
Justice Scalia's reasoning 2o(that juvenile transfer statutes ensure
individualized consideration). While it is undisputed that transfer statutes
ensure individualized consideration of defendants, Chief Justice Harding
believes that the United States Supreme Court was concerned with the
general concept of individualized consideration of maturity and moral
responsibility, using juvenile transfer statutes only as an example of
individualized consideration, not as a constitutional requirement.Y Chief
Justice Harding concluded that in Florida, the legislature has designated age
as a statutory mitigating circumstance, which, in his view, satisfies Justice
Scalia's concerns regarding individualized testing.203
4. Justice Wells Concurred in Part and Dissented in Part
Justice Wells concurred in the affirmance of guilt, but joined Chief
Justice Harding's dissent as to Brennan's sentence. Specifically, Justice
Wells argued that the majority's reliance on Allen as precedent in Brennan is
clearly wrong and an abuse of the doctrine of stare decisis.205 He argued that
Allen is precedent for cases involving people under sixteen while LeCroy is
precedent for Brennan.206 Justice Wells agreed with the majority's concernfor society's values for children, but said that the court has a responsibility
199. Id. at S374 n.23. Chief Justice Harding said that since 1989, three more states
have allowed for capital punishment but set a minimum age at 18, two states have moved from
having a minimum age of seventeen to having no minimum age, and Washington has decided
that no juveniles may be put to death. Id. Forty states allow capital punishment. Id. Out of
those, 19, including Florida, have no express minimum age limit. Id. The highest courts in
Alabama, Arizona, South Carolina, and Virginia have upheld cases where 16-year-old
defendants were sentenced to death. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S374 n.23. Vermont no
longer permits capital punishment for the crime of murder. See id.
200. Id. at S371.
201. Id. (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361,374-77 (1989)).
202. Id. Individualized consideration in capital sentencing is a constitutional
requirement. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 375.
203. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
204. Id. at S372 (Wells, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
205. Id.
206. Id.
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to exercise the doctrine of separation of powers. 2 7 He argued, since the
United States Supreme Court has already determined that the death penalty
is constitutional, whether or not to have the death penalty is a legislative
decision, which must be made by the individual state legislatures, not by
members of the court.208 Justice Wells determined that since the people are
imposing the punishment, it should be the 2people, through their elected
representatives, who decide the punishment. He concluded that in this
case, the majority, by one vote, has not sufficiently shown due respect to
"the 'authority' of the legislature and assumes too much authority. 210
IV. CONCLUSION
By vacating Keith Brennan's death sentence and holding it to be cruel
or unusual punishment under the Florida Constitution to execute sixteen-
year-old offenders using the rarity of executions standard, the Supreme
Court of Florida has accomplished the following. First, it has banned the
execution of sixteen-year-old offenders forever in Florida, unless the court
decides to review this issue again on certiorari and uses a standard other than
the rarity of executions standard.2z 1 Second, the rarity of executions
standard, if applied consistently, makes it impossible for Florida to ever
212initiate a new method of execution. This is because, if Florida attempts to
use lethal injection, for example, as its method of execution instead of the
electric chair, such method of punishment, which has not yet been used in
213Florida, will be rare and unusual. Based on that standard, courts could, in
theory, find that a new, more humane method of execution is
unconstitutional solely because it has never been used before.
It is unclear why the Supreme Court of Florida did not examine jury
determinations and legislative enactments in this case to resolve this issue. It
is also unclear why the court would use the rarity of executions standard
when it has had a hand in producing the statistics upon which it relies.
214
207. Id. at S371.
208. Brennan, 24 Fla. L. Weekly at S371.
209. Id.
210. Id. at S372.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 185-86.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
213. Id.
214. See Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1996); Morgan v. State, 639 So. 2d 6
(Fla. 1994); Morgan v. State, 537 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1989); Morgan v. State, 453 So. 2d 394
(Fla. 1984); Morgan v. State, 392 So. 2d 1315 (Fla. 1981). The Supreme Court of Florida
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Juries in Florida have recommended the death penalty six times over the last
twenty-five years for sixteen-year-old offenders, including Brennan, but the
Supreme Court of Florida has vacated the sentence each time on
technicalities having nothing to do with the defendant's age thereby
preventing the executions from being carried out.215 Finally, it is unclear
why, under the standard adopted by the court, it is not unconstitutional to
execute all offenders under the age of twenty.216
It is apparent that there is more than one standard that may be applied to
determine whether punishment is cruel or unusual. However, to maintain the
doctrine of stare decisis it is the court's duty to develop the most sensible
and most fair standard and apply it consistently.217
Andrew F. Garofalo
vacated Morgan's death sentence four times, Farina's death sentence once, and Brennan's
once after the juries had recommended the death penalty.
215. IL
216. See supra text accompanying notes 148 & 198.
217. See supra text accompanying note 208.
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